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A STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal arises out of an order by the Honorable Judge J.
Dennis Frederick that dismissed the State's criminal case against
Mr. Swenson. In his Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal, Judge
Frederick declared that the statute under which Mr. Swenson was
being prosecuted, Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-3(1) (1989), was
unconstitutionally

vague,

in

violation

of

the

due

process

requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United

States

of

America

and Article

I,

section

7 of

the

Constitution of the State of Utah. Because Judge Frederick's order
held a statute to be invalid, the prosecution has a right to
appeal. Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3)(d) (1990). This court has original
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of courts
of record holding a Utah statute to be unconstitutional under the
United States and Utah Constitutions.
2(3)(g)(Supp. 1990).

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-

A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE I: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN EXCEPTION TO THE DEFINITION OF
"AGENT" RESTS UPON THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Where an appeal raises questions of law

only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan
v. Utah Power & Light Co•, 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases
cited therein.
ISSUE II: ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TERMS "ISOLATED
TRANSACTION," "UNDERWRITER," AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE VAGUE,
DOES THAT MAKE THE DEFINITION OF "AGENT" UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
IN THE CONTEXT OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT, WHERE THE STATE ALLEGES THAT THE DEFENDANT
RECEIVED COMPENSATION FOR HIS SERVICES?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Where an appeal raises questions of law

only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases
cited therein.
ISSUE III: ARE THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS," "UNDERWRITER,"
AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE CONTEXT OF
A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Where an appeal raises questions of law

only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan
v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases
cited therein.
2

ISSUE IV: IF THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTION," "UNDERWRITER,"
AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, IS THE
STATUTE UNDER WHICH MR. SWENSON WAS CHARGED, WHICH MAKES
TRANSACTING SECURITIES BUSINESS IN UTAH AS AN UNREGISTERED AGENT
UNLAWFUL, SUFFICIENTLY WELL DEFINED TO PUT A REASONABLE PERSON ON
NOTICE, AND THEREFORE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE CONTEXT
OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Where an appeal raises questions of law

only, the appellate court will grant no deference to the trial
court's ruling, but will review it for correctness. City of Logan
v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990), and cases
cited therein.

3

THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Constitution

of the United States

of America

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, S 1
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The Constitution

of the State

of Utah

Utah Const, art. I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Statutes

of the State

of Utah

Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-3(1) (1989).
(1) It is unlawful for any person to conduct business
in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is
registered under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-13(2) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a brokerdealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or
4

attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities in
this state, and who:
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted
by Subsection 61-1-14 (l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection
61-1-14 (2); or
(c) effects transactions with existing employees,
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer.
A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or
issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions, is an aqent only if he
otherwise comes within this definition.
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-14 (1989 & Supp. 1990) (excerpts2).
(2) The following transactions are exempted from
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected
through a broker-dealer or not;
•

• •

(d) any transaction between the issuer or other
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an
underwriter, or among underwriters;
•

• •

(n) any
offering;

transactions

not

involving

a public

Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-14.5 (1989).
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil,
criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of
proving an exemption under section 61-1-14 or an
exception from a definition under section 61-1-13 is upon
the person claiming the exemption or exception.
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
Any person who willfully violates any provision of
this chapter except Section 61-1-16, or who willfully
x

The 1990 amendments, effective April 23, 1990, added the
words "in this state" to the first sentence, inserted the word
"employees" in subsection (c), and added the final sentence, none
of which changes are relevant to this case. Compare, 61-1-13(2)
(1989) with 61-1-13(2) (Supp. 1990).
2

The full text of this very lengthy section is reproduced as
an exhibit in the Addendum portion of this brief.
5

violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who
willfully violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement
made to be false or misleading in any material respect,
shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. No person
may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order
if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or
order. No indictment or information may be returned or
complaint filed under this chapter more than five years
after the alleged violation.
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-27 (1989).
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it and to co-ordinate the
interpretation and administration of this chapter with
the related federal regulation.
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-29 (1989).
If any provision of this chapter or its application
to any person
or circumstance
is he>ld invalid, the
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or
applications of the chapter which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

6

A STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THE NATURE OF THE CASE, AND THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE COURT BELOW.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing the criminal
information against the defendant, Arnold J. Swenson. Following a
preliminary hearing in the Third Judicial Circuit Court,3 Mr.
Swenson was bound over to the Third Judicial District Court on
three felony counts of sales of securities by an unregistered
agent, in violation of Utah Code Annotated sections 61-1-3(1) (1989)
(registration of broker-dealer, agent, investment advisor) and 611-21 (1989 and Supp. 1990) (making willful violations of § 61-1-3
a felony).

Mr. Swenson pled "not guilty" to the charges, and a

trial date was set.
Shortly before the trial date, Mr. Swenson filed a Motion to
Dismiss

based

upon

the

theory

that

section

61-1-3(1)

is

unconstitutionally vague, in violation of both the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and
Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
See, Motion to Dismiss, at R.
an expedited basis/

92-102.

Oral argument was held on

Following oral argument, Judge Frederick

3

Several charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
Those charges are not at issue in this case.
^Because of the short time remaining before trial, oral
argument was ordered for approximately two working days after the
State received a copy of the Motion to Dismiss. The State did not
have sufficient time in which to research, draft, and submit a
7

ruled from the bench that Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-3(1) is
unconstitutionally

vague

in

the

cont€*xt

of

a

criminal

investigation. Counsel for Mr. Swenson prepared for the court the
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal, which Judge Frederick
adopted and signed.

See, Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal,

at R. 146-150 (a copy of which is attached to this brief as Exhibit
A of the Addendum). This appeal is from Judge Frederick's Findings
of Fact and Order of Dismissal.
THE RELEVANT FACTS
This case did not go to trial.

Other than the procedural

history set forth above, there are no established facts relevant to
this appeal.

Indeed, the State believes that there is probably

only one area of substantial factual dispute.

In the event of a

trial, the State would put on evidence, in the form of testimony by
a co-conspirator, that Mr. Swenson received compensation for his
actions, while Mr. Swenson would rebut that evidence, probably
through testimony by Mr. Swenson himself.
and Order of Dismissal, at 2, f 2, R. 147.

brief in opposition to the motion.
8

See,

Findings of Fact

A SUMMARY OF THE APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS
The central question is whether Utah Code Annotated section
61-1-3(1) (1989) is unconstitutionally vague. That section reads:
"It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state
as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is registered under this
chapter." The State contends, in Point IV, that the statute is not
void for vagueness, even if, as Mr. Swenson argued and the trial
court found, three subparts of the exception to the definition of
an "agent" are held to be vague.

Section 51-1-3, by itself, is

sufficiently clear to put a reasonable person on notice as to what
behavior is legal and what is illegal.
The State also contends, most vigorously, in Point III, that
the three terms in question, "isolated transaction," "underwriter,"
and "public offering" each have well established meanings in the
area of securities law, and are not vague.
The issue of who has the burden of proving whether the
defendant can claim an exception to the definition of "agent" is
very important to this appeal.

In Point I, the State argues that

the exception is basically an affirmative defense in a criminal
case, and that once the defendant has provided some evidence that
the defense may be available, the burden is upon the State to
disprove the availability of the exception. In Point II, the State
argues that because the burden is on the State, the defendant
benefits

if some elements of the exception are vague.

The

vagueness of some elements, in essence, makes that part of the
affirmative defense unassailable by the prosecution.
9

THE APPELLANTS ARGUMENTS

INTRODUCTION:

UNDERSTANDING THE STATUTORY SCHEME

It is unlawful for an individual to transact business in Utah as
a securities
agent unless that individual is registered with the
Utah Division of
Securities.
Arnold J. Swenson was bound over for trial on three counts of
sales of securities by an unregistered agent. The basic principle
in this case, that sales of securities by an unregistered agent is
a violation of Utah's criminal law, is unambiguously set forth in
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1
61-1-30 (1989 & Supp. 1990).

through

Section 61-1-3 states emphatically

that "[i]t is unlawful for any person to transact business in this
state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is registered under
this chapter."

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1) (1989).

violation of section 61-1-3 is a felony.5
61-1-21 (1989 & Supp. 1990).

See,

A willful

Utah Code Ann. §

If Mr. Swenson willfully transacted

business, as an agent, in Utah, without b€»ing registered, he is
guilty of a felony.6
Violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act are
undesignated felonies. At the time that Mr, Swenson is alleged to
have sold securities, the maximum penalty provided by section 61-121 was a prison term of zero to three years, plus a fine of
$10,000. Effective April 23, 1990, the prison term was increased
to zero to five years. Compare, 61-1-21 (1989) with 61-1-21 (Supp.
1990).
6

Without delving into a deep constitutional analysis at this
point in this brief, the State contends that the language of
section 61-1-3(1) is, at the least, a crystal clear warning to the
10

The definition
of the word "Agent" is comprised of two parts: a
general definition,
and an exception to that definition.
In
order for the exception to apply, three conditions must be met.
In

order

to

follow

the

arguments

in

this

brief,

an

understanding of the statutory structure used to define the word
"Agent"

is

essential.

Section

61-1-13(2) defines

"Agent"

as

follows:
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a brokerdealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for effecting or
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities in
this state, and who:
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted
by Subsection 61-1-14 (l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or
(j);
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection
61-1-14 (2); or
(c) effects transactions with existing employees,
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer.
A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer
or issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions, is an agent only if he
otherwise comes within this definition.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

61-1-13(2)

(1989

&

Supp.

1990)

amendments, effective April 23, 1990, added the words
state" to the first sentence, inserted the word

(The

1990

"in this

"employees" in

subsection (c), and added the final sentence; those changes are not
relevant to this case).

That definition of "Agent" consists of

two parts. The first sentence, "'Agent' means any individual other

citizenry that transacting business in the area of securities,
without being licensed, is highly likely to be illegal.
A
reasonable person, so warned, would not engage in such a venture
without first obtaining a thorough understanding of exactly what
the law allows and what it prohibits.
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than a broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities"
is the basic definition (hereinafter the "Basic Definition").

The

remainder of the definition consists of an exception to the Basic
Definition (hereinafter the "Exception"). Naturally, the Exception
is only of interest if a person meets the Basic Definition of an
Agent.
In order for the Exception to apply to an individual, three
criteria (hereinafter the three "Criteria") must be met:

First,

the individual must represent an issuer; second, the individual
must receive

"no commission or other remuneration, directly or

indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or
sales of securities"; and third, the transaction in question must
be one of the types of transactions identified in subsections (a),
(b), or (c). All three of these Criteria must be present; if any
one is not present, then the Exception to the Basic Definition of
"Agent" does not exist.

The Third Criteria

for the Exception

warrants further analysis because Mr. Swenson's vagueness claim
rests solely on the assertion that three sub-options of one option
for establishing the Third Criteria are unconstitutionally vague.
The Third Criteria may be satisfied by establishing that the
transaction at issue is any one of the following:
(a) [a transaction] in securities exempted by
Subsection 61-1-14 (l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or (j);
(b) [a transaction] exempted by Subsection
61-1-14 (2); or
(c) [a transaction] with existing employees,
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer.
Subsection (a) encompasses a number of transactions that involve
12

securities

that

are

themselves

exempt

from

the

requirements of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
Ann. § 61-1-7

registration

See, Utah Code

(1989) (requiring that securities be registered

before sale); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-15 (1989) (requiring that sales
literature be filed before distribution); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14
(1989 and Supp. 1990) (listing exemptions to the registration and
filing requirements). Subsection (c) encompasses transactions that
are with the issuer's employees.

Neither subsection

(a) nor

subsection (c) are directly at issue in this case.
Subsection (b) encompasses transactions in securities that
usually would need to be registered under section 61-1-7, but which
are eligible for an exemption from registration under section 61-114(2) due to the nature of the transaction involved (hereinafter
referred to as "Transactional Exemptions").

Section 61-1-14(2)

lists seventeen Transactional Exemptions, any one of which can
serve to establish the Third Criteria for the Exception from the
Basic Definition of "Agent."

Swenson argues that three of the

Transactional Exemptions are potentially relevant to this case, yet
are so vague that the entire definition of "Agent" must be declared
unconstitutionally vague for purposes of a criminal prosecution.
Those three Transactional Exemptions are as follows:
(2) The following transactions are exempted from
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected
through a broker-dealer or not;
. . .

(d) any transaction between the issuer or other
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an
underwriter, or among underwriters;
. . .

(n) any
offering;

transactions
13

not

involving

a public

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(2) (1989).

It is the State's position

that none of the three Transactional Exemptions are vague, but that
even if one or more of them are vague, that defect would not render
unconstitutionally vague the entire concept that a person who sells
securities as an agent in Utah must be registered.
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVING AN EXCEPTION TO THE DEFINITION OF
-AGENT" RESTS UPON THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE.
The cornerstone of Mr. Swenson's argument in his Motion to
Dismiss is his assertion that, under the Utah Uniform Securities
Act, the defendant in a criminal case has the burden of proving
that the Exception to the Basic Definition of an "Agent" applies.
That assertion is based upon Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14.5
(1989), which declares

that

M

[i]n any proceeding

under this

chapter, civil, criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden
of proving an exemption under Section 61-1-14 or an exception from
a definition under Section 61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the
exemption or exception."

It is largely because of this perceived

burden that Mr. Swenson argues that the potential vagueness of
three Transactional Exemptions — which are, after all, only three
of a myriad of options for satisfying the Third Criterion for
establishing the Exception to the Basic Definition of "Agent" —
renders the entire statutory scheme concerning unregistered agents
unconstitutional.
Judge Frederick relied even more heavily on section 61-1-14.5
in his Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal.
number 5 is explicit:

Finding of Fact

"Under the provisions of Section 61-1-14.5,
14

U.C.A., the burden of proving the availability of an exemption from
the registration requirement under Section 61-1-13 is upon the
claimant, in this case the defendant."

Likewise, Judge Frederick

stated in Finding of Fact number 9 that "the Court finds that the
failure of the legislature to have provided definitions of the
terms "isolated transactions", "underwriter", and "public offering"
renders it impossible for Defendant Swenson to sustain his burden
of establishing that he was not acting as an "agent" when he
effected the securities transactions at issue in this case . . . "
The problem with Mr. Swenson's reasoning, and with Findings of
Fact numbers 5 and 9, is that under Utah law, despite the language
of section 61-1-14.5, the burden of disproving the existence of an
Exception to the Basic Definition of an "Agent," and the burden of
disproving

(if

necessary)

the

existence

of

a

Transactional

Exemption, falls squarely upon the State in a criminal case.
Obviously, a key element of the crime of sales of securities by an
unregistered agent is proof that the defendant is an "Agent" as
that

term

is

defined

in

section

61-1-13(2).

Because

"[a]

fundamental precept of our criminal law is that the State must
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt," State v.
Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), it is the State's burden to prove
that Mr. Swenson is an "Agent."

The State cannot meet that burden

in this case without disproving the existence of the Exception to
the Basic Definition of "Agent."
Section 61-1-14.5 merely defines the issue of proving the
Exception as being, in essence, an affirmative defense. In a civil
15

context, a statute may place the burden of proving a fact upon the
defendant.

In a criminal context, however, the Utah courts have

recognized on numerous occasions that the legislature may not put
the burden of proof upon the defendant.

"Unlike some other

jurisdictions, Utah imposes on the prosecution the burden to
disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable
doubt

once the defendant

has produced

some evidence

defense." State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah), cert,

of the
denied,

459 U.S. 988 (1982). Thus, the burden of disproving the existence
of the Exception to the Basic Definition of "Agent" rests squarely
on the State.7
The recent case of State v. Tebbs, 786 P. 2d 775 (Utah App.
1990) is illustrative of the foregoing principle. In that case the
defendant argued that the communications fraud statute, Utah Code
Annotated section 76-10-1801 (1989), denied the defendant's right
to due process under both the United States and Utah Constitutions
because it provided

that

f

'[i]t is an affirmative defense to

prosecution under this section that the [untrue statements] were
not made . . . knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the
truth."

On its face, the statute reverses the traditional burden

of proof and requires that the defendant disprove the existence of
a culpable mental state. The Court of Appeals ignored the language
of

the

statute, however,

calling

7

it merely

"a statement of

Mr. Swenson sets forth "some evidence of the defense," in the
arguments contained on pages 7 and 8 of his Motion to Dismiss.
Those arguments are based upon the State's theory of the case at
the preliminary hearing with regard to counts against Mr. Swenson
that were dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
16

conditions under which the defendant cannot be found guilty," and
reiterated that "Utah has unambiguously adopted the position that
'a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in presenting
an affirmative defense'."

Tebbs, 786 P.2d at 778-779.

In light of the large body of Utah case law that categorically
states that the prosecution has the burden of proving every element
of a crime, whether the element is designated as an affirmative
defense or not, section 61-1-14.5 should be read in criminal cases
as merely requiring that the defendant put forth some evidence of
entitlement to the Exception, including some evidence of the Third
Criterion for claiming the Exception.8

At that point, the burden

of actually disproving the existence of the Exception lies entirely
with the State.
The trial court erred when it determined that the burden of
proof is on Mr. Swenson to establish that he is entitled to the
benefit of the Exception. Because that erroneous assumption was at
the heart of the trial court's reasoning in its Findings of Fact
and Order of Dismissal, that order should be overturned and the
8

The requirement that the defendant provide "some evidence" of
entitlement to nhe Exception, as per Wood, is not a burdensome
requirement, and is eminently reasonable in light of the large
number of possible ways in which the defendant could conceivably
satisfy the Third Criterion to qualify for the Exception. As
explained in Tebbs:
A defendant's burden concerning any affirmative
defense is quite limited. State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d
688, 691 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
"As a practical
matter, a defendant may have to assume the burden of
producing some evidence [of the affirmative defense] if
there is no evidence in the prosecution's case that would
provide some kind of evidentiary foundation for [an
affirmative defense claim]." State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d
211, 215 (Utah 1985).
17

case remanded for trial.
POINT II: ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TERMS "ISOLATED
TRANSACTION," "UNDERWRITER," AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE VAGUE, THE
DEFINITION OF "AGENT" IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE
CONTEXT OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT, WHERE THE STATE ALLEGES THAT THE DEFENDANT
RECEIVED COMPENSATION FOR HIS SERVICES.

Because the State bears the burden of proving the
non-existence
of the Exception to the Basic Definition of "Agent," a ruling
that one or more of the terms "isolated
transaction,"
"underwriter," and "public offering" are unconstitutionally
vague
would benefit the defendant; the vagueness of the terms would
make conviction more difficult,
rather than less
difficult.
The issue of burden of proof is critical to this case.
Normally, of course, a vague statute deprives a defendant of due
process because the defendant cannot grasp a firm definition in
order to establish that he falls outside the proscribed conduct.
Where the vagueness goes to an element of an affirmative defense
that the State must disprove, however, the defendant may be in an
enhanced position.

If the State must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt the unavailability of the Exception to the Basic Definition
of "Agent," then any ambiguity as to the nature of the Exception
would only benefit the defendant.

If any Transactional Exemption

is unconstitutionally vague, that would only make it more likely
that the State could not meet its burden of proof.
In order to fully understand this point, it is important to
recall that there are three Criteria required for the establishment
of the Exception. All three Criteria must be established, or else
the Exception does not exist.

Therefore, the State may disprove

the existence of the Exception, and satisfy its burden of proof, by

18

categorically showing that any one of the three Criteria cannot be
met by the defendant.

Assume, arguendo,

that one or more of the

Three Transactional Exemptions, which could be used to satisfy the
Third Criteria, are held to be vague.

It then becomes impossible

for the State to prove that Mr. Swenson is not entitled to claim
the vague Transactional Exemption.

That, in turn, means that the

State cannot disprove the existence of the Third Criteria, because
it is always possible that Mr. Swenson meets the definition of the
vague Transactional Exemption.

The State must, therefore, attack

one of the first two Criteria in order to establish that the
Exception does not exist.

The State is fully prepared to disprove the existence
of the
Exception to the Basic Definition
solely on the grounds that Mr.
Swenson received remuneration,
thereby mooting the issue of
whether the Transactional
Exemptions are vague, and
eliminating
the need for jury instructions
defining the terms at
issue.
In this case, the State has determined that it will attack the
availability of the Exception to the Basic Definition of Agent
solely on the basis of the Second Criterion for establishing that
Exception.

The Second Criterion is that Mr. Swenson, in order to

be eligible for the Exception, must have "received no commission or
other remuneration, directly or indirectly,

for effecting or

attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-13(2).

Since the State can meet its burden of

defeating the Exception by disproving any one of the three Criteria
that establish the Exception, the State has discretion over which
Criterion it will attack. The State is willing to proceed to trial
19

based on a jury instruction stating that the* jury can only convict
if it finds that Mr, Swenson received compensation.
approach

makes

jury

instructions

that

define

The State's
"isolated

transactions," "underwriter," or "public offering" unnecessary,
thereby eliminating an essential finding in Judge Frederick's
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal.
This approach by the State should have the effect of allowing
this appeal to be resolved without recourse to an analysis of the
vagueness of the underlying terms (this court would still have to
address the question of the proper interpretation of section 61-114.5).

The approach is also perfectly fair to Mr. Swenson.

Whether or not any of the three terms in question is vague, there
can be no doubt from even a cursory reading of section 61-1-13(2)
that no person who receives a commission or other remuneration
could hope to qualify for the Exemption. On that point, at least,
the statute is entirely unambiguous.

Nor does the potential

vagueness of a portion of the definition of "Agent" hopelessly
taint the remainder. Utah statutory and case law supports severing
the unconstitutional portion if at all feasible, which it is in
this case.
Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-29 provides that if any
provision of the Utah Uniform Securities Act is held to be invalid,
"the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications
of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid
provision

or

application."

severance in vagueness cases.

Likewise, Utah

case

law

favors

Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor
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Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982) ("if a portion
of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is
unconstitutional, such should be done."); State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah
2d 66, 426 P.2d 13, 14-15 (1967) ("[t]he void part [of a statute]
may be disregarded, and the valid part enforced.").

In this case,

if some of the options for establishing the Third Criterion for the
Exception are void, this court need merely strike the requirement
that the Third Criterion be met for purposes of establishing the
existence of the Exception to the General Definition of Agent in a
criminal prosecution.

This means that the State would have one

less way of attacking the defendant's entitlement to the Exception,
which can only strengthen the defendant's case.
POINT III: THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS,M "UNDERWRITER," AND
"PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN THE CONTEXT
OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT.

A term is not unconstitutionally
vague just because it lacks
absolute exactitude
of expression or comvlete precision of
meaning.
A brief examination of the vagueness doctrine is in order
before the specific terms at issue are analyzed.

It is hornbook

law that under the "due process" clauses of both the United States
Constitution,

U.S.

Const,

amend.

XIV,

§

1,

and

the

Utah

Constitution, Utah Const, art. I, § 7, a criminal law that is too
vague

or

indefinite

unconstitutional.

in

meaning

can

be

declared

to

be

The United States Supreme Court provided an

excellent analysis of the vagueness doctrine in Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flioside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.. 455 U.S. 489 (1982),
21

which is worthy of a lengthy quotation:
A law . . . may nevertheless be challenged on its
face as unduly vague, in violation of due process. To
succeed, however, the complainant must demonstrate that
the law is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications.
. ..
The standards for evaluating vagueness were
enunciated in Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed 2d 222 (1972):
Vague laws offend several important
values. First, because we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person
of
ordinary
intelligence
a
reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning.
Second,
if
arbitrary
and
discriminatory
enforcement
is
to
be
prevented,
laws
must
provide
explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague
law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory
applications
(footnotes
omitted).
These standards should not, of course, be
mechanically applied. The degree of vagueness that the
Constitution tolerates —
as well as the relative
importance of fair notice and fair enforcement — depends
in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic
regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test
because its subject matter is often more narrow, and
because businesses, which face economic demands to plan
behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant
legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated
enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of
the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an
administrative process.
Village

of

omitted).

Hoffman

Estates, 455 U.S. at

497-498

(footnotes

The United States Supreme Court has never required that

a statute be entirely unambiguous:
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to
give notice of the required conduct to one who would
avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its
application and the lawyer in defending one charged with
22

its violation. But few words possess the precision of
mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold
and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the
practical necessities of discharging the business of
government inevitably limit the specificity with which
legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no
more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be
demanded.
Nor is it unfair to require that one who
deliberately goes perilously close to an area of
proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross
the line.
Bovce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952)
(holding regulation stating that

"[d]rivers of motor vehicles

transporting any explosive . . .shall avoid, so far as
and,

where

feasible,

practicable,

• . . driving into or through congested

thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled,

. . . and

dangerous crossings" not void for vagueness).9
Utah law follows the basic approach set forth in Village of
Hoffman Estates, Gravned, and Bovce Motor Homes, Inc.:
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561
(1952), we recognized that a criminal violation should be
described with sufficient certainty so that persons of
ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know
9

The decision in Bovce Motor Lines, Inc. implies that people
involved in trucking hazardous material would be aware of the long
history of regulation in that area, a view that was later confirmed
and expanded upon in United States v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (in cases where "dangerous
or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who
is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must
be presumed to be aware of the regulation"). If it is reasonable
to presume that a person who transports explosives would be aware
of the myriad regulations governing such conduct, and if it is
reasonable to require that person to assume the risk for deliberate
behavior that "goes perilously close to an area of proscribed
conduct," then it is equally reasonable to presume that Mr. Swenson
would be aware that securities transactions are a highly regulated
area, and it is equally reasonable to require that Mr. Swenson take
the risk associated with blindly engaging in such transactions
without becoming a registered agent.
23

how to govern themselves in conformity with it. See
generally Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P. 2d 805 (1974);
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294,
33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74
S.Ct 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). At the same time in the
Packard case, we stated that neither absolute exactitude
of expression nor complete precision of meaning can be
expected.
State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Utah 1981) (upholding as not
vague a law that criminalized failure to return rental property
where the defendant's conduct is a "gross deviation"

from the terms

of the rental agreement).
In short, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague simply
because it is subject to some uncertainty of application or
definition.

Indeed, under Utah law every effort should be made to

uphold the constitutionality of the statute.

"Legislation should

not be judicially declared invalid on the ground that it is
unintelligible or uncertain unless it is so imperfect and deficient
as to render it susceptible of no reasonable construction that will
give it effect, or the court finds itself unable to divine the
purpose and intent of the legislature."
P.2d 870, 873-874 (Utah 1957).

Kent Club v. Toronto, 305

In State ex rel.

L. G .A., 641 P.2d

127 (Utah 1982), this court went even further:

"Pursuant to our

obligation to construe a statute, wherever possible, to avoid
constitutional infirmities such as vagueness and overbreadth, In re
Nelda Bover, Utah 636 P.2d 1085 (1981), we are obligated to seek to
construe a criminal statute to give specific content to terms that
might otherwise be unconstitutionally vague."

State ex rel.

L. G.

A. r 641 P. 2d at 131 (this court then went on to define the term
"gross lewdness" so as to preserve the constitutionality of the
24

statute that makes lewdness a crime).
The foregoing principles of lenient statutory construction,
favoring constitutionality, are particularly valid in the highly
regulated area of securities law, where people are presumed to be
aware of the risk of regulation.10

There are no Utah cases

concerning vagueness in the area of securities law, but cases from
other states with similar "blue sky" laws1J emphasize the point.12
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Oklahoma, No. F-88-503, slip op. at ca. 5
(Okla. Crim. App. March 18, 1991) (holding that statute making it
10

Also, securities laws are particularly well shielded from the
problems of official abuse often associated with successful
vagueness challenges.
Statutes that prohibit such generalized
behavior as "loitering" are often held to be vague largely because
they can be used by police, prosecutors, and judges to persecute
individuals or groups of individuals. For example, "loitering"
statutes were often used during the civil rights movement to arrest
political protestors, or even people who just happened to be
members of a racial minority. It is hard to fathom how the crime
of "sale of securities by an unregistered agent" could be used as
an instrument of such wholesale discrimination. Regardless of how
the term "Agent" is defined, only persons who transact business in
securities, without being registered as an agent, could possibly be
legally arrested. C£. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1972) (striking vagrancy laws as unconstitutionally
vague, largely because of a documented history of police abuse).
n

For some reason, state laws governing securities are refered
to as "blue sky" laws. Most state securities laws, including
Utah's, predate the federal securities laws by ten or twenty years
the name probably comes from legislative concern that
speculators and promoters were trying to "sell the blue sky" or
"paint a blue sky picture" to investors.
12

Case law from states with similar "blue sky" laws is
particularly relevant in light of Utah Code Annotated section 61-127 (1989), which states that "[t]his chapter may be so construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and
administration of this chapter with the related federal
regulation." To the best of counsel's knowledged, no state or
federal "blue sky" law has ever been declared unconstitutionally
vague.
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illegal to act as an unregistered investment advisor, agent or
broker-dealer was not unconstitutionally vague:

"These statutory

provisions are clearly stated and understandable by an ordinary
person in a commercial context.")13; Huett v. State, 672 S.W.2d 533
(Tex. App. 1984) (securities fraud statute held not vague, noting
that "greater leeway is allowed when a court considers allegations
of vagueness and indefiniteness in 'regulatory statutes governing
business

activities'",

quoting

Papachristou

v.

City

of

Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (Papachristou is a case
holding a vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness); Favor v. State,
389 So.2d 557, 563 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (unregistered securities
/ unregistered agent case; statute held not vague: "There is great
risk of serious financial injury to the investing public in the
highly specialized

field of

securities transactions, and all

sellers of securities are charged with knowledge of and compliance
with all statutes and regulations governing such sales."); State v.
Martin,

187 N.W.2d

576, 579

(S.D. 1971)

(agent

requirement and anti-fraud provision not vague:

13

registration

"Admittedly it is

This case addresses the issue of who bears the burden of
proof to establish an exemption or exception to the definitions
contained in the Oklahoma "blue sky" laws. The Oklahoma statute,
like Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14.5, purports to place the
burden to establish affirmative defenses on the defendant. The
case states that no "blue sky" law has ever been declared
unconstitutional due to that burden being on the defendant.
Because "the existence of an exemption is not an element of the
charge," the burden can be placed upon the defendant under Oklahoma
law. As discussed under Point I of this brief, Utah law appears to
be peculiar in that a defendant is never required to prove the
elements of an affirmative defense, but need merely offer some
evidence that the defense exists, at which point the State has the
burden of disproving the defense.
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broad and comprehensive but the sale of securities is complicated
and complex.").1A
With these principles firmly in mind, it is time to address
the specific question of whether any of the three terms, "isolated
transaction," "underwriter," or "public offering," can be said to
be unconstitutionally vague.

The term "isolated
Utah
Transaction

Code

transaction"
Annotated

Exemption

for

is not unconstitutionally

section
"any

61-1-14(2)(a)

isolated

effected through a broker-dealer or not."

vague.

provides

transaction,

a

whether

In a very early "blue

sky" law case, ironically named State v. Swenson, the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that a statute exempting isolated sales
not

"made in the course of repeated and successive sales of

securities of the same issue" was not void for vagueness. State v.
Swenson, 215 N.W. 177, 179 (Minn. 1927).15

Since that time, a

14

The Martin case identifies a vagueness challenge to both the
agent registration statute and the anti-fraud statute, and both
provisions are quoted in the opinion. The "not vague for voidness"
holding only explicitly identifies the anti-fraud statute, but
because the conviction is upheld, ana because the opinion says
nothing to indicate that the agent registration statute might be
vague, that statute was apparently upheld sub silentio
against the
vagueness charge.
15

Interestingly, it was the phrase "in the course of repeated
and successive sales" that was specifically addressed in Swenson.
Apparently, the "isolated sales" part of the sentence caused little
concern. The case of Kneeland v. Emerron, 183 N.E. 155 (Mass.
1932) is similar. There a vagueness attack was made upon a statute
that exempted "any isolated sale of any security by the owner . .
not being made in the course of repeated and successive
transactions of a like character." Id., at 163. The court noted
that: "It is not contended that there is ambiguity about the words
'isolated sale.' They do not seem susceptible of misconstruction."
Id.
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great many states have examined the issue of whether a particular
case involved an "isolated transaction,"

See, Getter v. R.G.

Dickinson & Co.. 366 F.Supp 559, 578-579 & n.4 (S.D.Iowa 1973)
(citing to Note, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1635, 1646 n.70

(1965)).

It

appears that no state has ever found the term to be vague, even
though the exact number of transactions allowed is not defined with
precision.
Some general guidelines do emerge from, a review of the cases.
Half a dozen or more sales in a narrow period of time almost
uniformly are deemed not to be isolated, while one or two sales
almost always are treated as isolated.
becomes one for the jury.

See,

In between, the issue

e.g., State v. Ferguson, 86 N.W.2d

901 (1957) (whether sales were "isolated" is a jury question; case
involved five or six sales). There is only one Utah case on point,
Johnson v. Crail, 11 Utah 2d 392, 360 P.2d 485 (1961); that case
affirmed a finding that two sales were an isolated transaction.
The State submits that a definition of "isolated transaction"
that treats more than six related sales as being not isolated as a
matter of law (see, e.g., Sisson v. State, 404 P. 2d 55 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1964) (ten sales not an "isolated transaction"), one sale as
being isolated as a matter of law, and two to six sales as being
isolated or not isolated based on the facts of the case (were the
sales part of the same transaction,16 were they motivated by the

16

In Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 618 (5th Cir. 1974) the
court held that two sales very closely related in time and
negotiated together constituted a single transaction.
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same facts/7 etc. . .) is not unreasonable or vague.
If this court believes that a more definite standard is
necessary, however, it could adopt the bright-line test in place in
several states that "an 'isolated' sale means one standing alone,
disconnected from any other."

Kneeland, 183 N.E. at 163.

The term "underwriter"

is not unconstitutionally

Utah

section

Code

Annotated

vague.

61-l-14(2)(d)

provides

an

exemption from registration for "any transaction between the issuer
or other person on whose behalf the offering is made and an
underwriter,
"underwriter"

or

among

is

Securities Act.

not

underwriters."
defined

anywhere

Admittedly,
in

the

the

Utah

term

Uniform

Unlike the term "isolated transaction," the term

"underwriter" is not an intuitive term that has a commonplace
meaning outside of the realm of securities law.

Section 61-1-27

provides, however, that the Utah Uniform Securities Act is to be
construed so as to coordinate its interpretation with the related
federal regulations.
The concept of "underwriter" is an important part of the 1933
Securities Act, and is defined in section 2(11) of that act.18

15

17

Again in Vohs, the Fifth Circuit found that two transactions
eight months apart, and motivated by different factors, were not
related and did not serve to defeat the isolated transaction
exemption. Vohs, 495 F.2d at 618-619.
18

(11) The term "underwriter" means any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or
participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct
or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term
shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a
commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual
29

U.S.C. § 77b(ll). Although that definition is rather lengthy, the
concept behind it is rather simple.19 As the Tenth Circuit stated,
in a case that arose in Utah:

"An underwriter is one who has

purchased stock from the issuer with an intent to resell to the
public."

G.

Eugene

England

Foundation

v.

First

Corporation, 663 F.2d 988, 989 (10th Cir. 1973).
Circuit

recently provided

a more detailed, yet

Federal

The Eighth
still easily

understandable, definition s
The statutory definition of "underwriter" is found
in § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1988).
"The term
'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer
and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in
this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an
issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled
by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common
control with the issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll).
19

See, Federal Supervision of Traffic in Investment Securities
in Interstate Commerce Report. 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., Rpt. No. 85,
at 13-14 (1933):
Paragraph (11) sets forth the important definition
of "underwriter." The term is defined broadly enough to
include not only the ordinary underwriter, who for a
commission promises to see that an issue is disposed of
at a certain price, but also includes as an underwriter
the person who purchases an issue outright with the idea
of then selling that issue to the public. The definition
of underwriter is also broad enough to include two other
groups of persons who perform functions, similar in
character, in the distribution of a large issue. The
first of these groups may be designated as the
underwriters of the underwriter, a group who, for a
commission, agree to take over pro rata the underwriting
risk assumed by the first underwriter. The second group
may be termed participants in the underwriting or
outright purchase, who may or may not be formal parties
to the underwriting contract, but who are given a certain
share or interest therein. Id., at 13.
This statement of congressional intent goes a long way toward
establishing the boundaries of the concept of "underwriter."
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in connection with, the distribution of any security."
The congressional intent in defining "underwriter" was to
cover all persons who might operate as conduits for the
transfer of securities to the public. T. Hazen, The Law
of Securities Regulation § 4.24, at 141 (1985) (quoting
H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933)).
Thus, "underwriter" is generally defined in close
connection
with
the definition
and meaning of
"distribution."
See, Eugene England, 663 F.2d at 989
("An underwriter is one who has purchased stock from the
issuer with an intent to resell to the public.");
Ingenito v. Bermec Corp.. 441 F.Supp 525, 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) ("It is apparent that to be an underwriter within
the meaning of the '33 Act, one must participate, in some
manner, in the distribution of the securities to the
public")
The term "underwriter" thus focuses on
"distribution."
Given the statutory definition of
"underwriter," the exemption should be available if: (1)
the acquisition of the securities was not made "with a
view to" distribution; or (2) the sale was not made "for
an issuer in connection with" a distribution.
Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 1328, 1335-1336 (8th Cir. 1989).20
Under the Ackerberg test, all that a person has to do to insure
that he or she is an "underwriter" is to become a conduit for the
transfer of securities to the public, either by acquiring the
securities with a view toward their public distribution, or by
selling securities for an issuer in connection with a public
distribution.

People of average intelligence can easily apply the

Ackerberg test to determine if it will provide a legal exception

20

The language at the end of the Ackerberg quote may appear
confusing. This is because the exemption to the 1933 Securities
Act in question exempts people who are not underwriters,
issuers,
or dealers.
This is exactly the opposite of the state exemption,
which applies only to people who are underwriters.
Thus, the
criteria given at the end of the Ackerberg quote, that (1) the
acquisition was not made with a view to distribution, or (2) the
sale was not made for an issuer in connection with a distribution,
are the criteria for being declared not to be an underwriter. If
an acquisition is made with a view to distribution, or if a sale is
made for an issue in connection with a distribution, then the
person who made the acquisition or sale is an underwriter.
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for

their

otherwise

illegal

conduct

of

selling

unregistered

securities.21

The term "public offering"
The so called

is not unconstitutionally

vague.

"private offering exemption" of Utah Code

Annotated section 61-1-14(2)(n) states that "any transactions not
involving a public offering" are exempt from the registration
requirements of section 61-1-7. The key term, "public offering" is
not subject to a narrowly tailored definition; it expresses a
policy concept that, because of its nature, must remain somewhat
fluid.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co.,

346 U.S. 119 (1953) is the key case defining "public offering":
Exemption from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act is the question.
The design of the
statute is to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed
investment decisions. The natural way to interpret the
private offering exemption is in light of the statutory
purpose. Since exempt transactions are those as to which
"there is no practical need for . . . [the bill's]
application," the applicability of § 4(1) should turn on
whether the particular class of persons affected need the
protection of the Act. An offering to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction
"not involving any public offering."
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 984. Although this definition does
not specify exactly which offerings will be deemed public and which
will be deemed private, it does establish a conceptual framework
for making such an analysis.

The idea is to look at the whole

group of people to whom the offering is being made, and then to
21

0f course, as noted above, there is a direct tie-in between
the 1933 Securities Act and the state "blue sky" laws. In proving
an exemption from state registration requirements, a person would
normally be proving that he or she fell under the jurisdiction of
the 1933 Securities Act.
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decide whether all of those people are the sort who have no
practical need for registration•

Unless it is clear that all of

the offerees would not benefit appreciably by registration the
offering is public.
By

itself, the Ralston Purina

Co. definition

serves to

establish a fairly clear division that suffices for many, if not
most, cases.

Fortunately, there are hundreds of other cases, a

sizable

of

body

regulatory

law,

and

numerous

treatises

and

commentaries, all which help define "public offering" in particular
contexts.

While an analysis of those sources is beyond the scope

of this brief, a quick reference to United States v. Crosby, 294
F.2d 928 (2nd. Cir. 1961) is in order. That case raised the issue
of whether the term "public offering" is unconstitutionally vague
in a criminal prosecution.
not:

The Second Circuit held that it was

"While the term "public offering" in the statute alone might

possibly be open to an attack on grounds of vagueness, the judicial
gloss placed on this legislation by the Supreme Court in Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 1953, 346 U.S. 119,
73 S.Ct. 981, 97 L.Ed. 1494, two years before the acts here
charged, cured any defect which might have existed."
F.2d at 952.

Crosby, 294

Ever since the Crosby decision, the question of

whether "public offering" is a vague term has been deemed settled
in federal law.22

In light of Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-

22

Counsel is unaware of any case in another state that decided
the issue of whether the term "public offering" is vague. It
appears, therefore, that the matter is settled with regard to
general "blue sky" law.
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27 's emphasis on coordinating construction of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act with construction given to federal securities laws,
the term "public offering" should be deemed not to be vague due to
the substantial judicial, administrative, and scholarly gloss put
on the term by Ralston Purina and its progeny.

To the extent that Mr. Swenson did not understand one or more of
the three terms in question,
he could have requested an
interpretive
opinion, or no-action letter,
from the Utah Division
of
Securities.
One factor that the United States Supreme Court identified in
Village of Hoffman Estates as being relevant to a vagueness inquiry
is the availability of "resort to an administrative process" in
order to clarify the meaning of the law.
Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.

Village of Hoffman

Just such an option was open to Mr.

Swenson, if he had actually read the statutes and found himself
confused either as to the specific meaning of the terms "isolated
transaction," "underwriter," or "public offering" or as to whether
he would be considered to be an "Agent" under Utah Code Annotated
section 61-1-3.
The Utah Administrative Code allows for an individual to
request an interpretive opinion or a no-action letter23 from the
Utah Division of Securities.

Under Utah Administrative Code Rule

23

The phrase "no-action letter" is used in both federal and
state securities law practice. It refers to a specific type of
interpretive opinion in which a regulatory body, such as the
Federal Securities and Exchange Commission or the Utah Division of
Securities, states that it will take no adverse legal action
against the party inquiring, with regard to a specific transaction,
if the facts of the transaction are actually as they were
represented to be by the party inquiring.
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R177-25-5 (1990), an interpretive opinion or no-action letter is
available

with

regard

to

any

securities

matter

except

the

application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act. Admittedly, the interpretive opinion or no-action
letter is not binding on the Division of Securities or the Office
of the Attorney General; even so, they "can be relied upon as
representing the current views of the Division," Utah Admin. Code
R177-25-5(2) (1990), and it is very difficult to imagine that a
person would be prosecuted criminally for following the advice
given in a no-action letter, providing that the person honestly and
accurately set forth the facts at issue when requesting the letter.

If this Court determines that one or more of the challenged
terms
is unconstitutionally
vague, this Court should be careful
to
limit its holding to the scope of this case, namely criminal
prosecutions
of unregistered
agents under the Utah Uniform
Securities
Act.
The terms at issue in this case, "isolated transaction,"
"underwriter," and "public offering," are used throughout both
state and federal securities law. This case only raises the issue
of whether those terms are vague in the narrow context of a
criminal prosecution under the Utah Uniform Securities Act for the
crime of transacting business as an unregistered agent. Because of
the havoc that a finding of vagueness could have upon all aspects
of the securities laws of this state, the federal government, and
most other states, it is important to limit the scope of any
vagueness ruling to the scope of this case. What may be vague for
a criminal prosecution of an unregistered agent may not be vague
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for purposes of enforcing a stop and desist order against a company
that is trading unregistered stock, for example.

However, unless

the scope of any finding of vagueness is carefully limited, all
efforts to enforce securities registration procedures will be
called into question.
POINT IV: EVEN IF THE TERMS "ISOLATED TRANSACTION,"
"UNDERWRITER," AND "PUBLIC OFFERING" ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE, THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH MR. SWENSON WAS CHARGED, WHICH
MAKES TRANSACTING SECURITIES BUSINESS IN UTAH AS AN UNREGISTERED
AGENT UNLAWFUL, IS SUFFICIENTLY WELL DEFINED TO PUT A REASONABLE
PERSON ON NOTICE, AND IS THEREFORE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
When all is said and donef the ultimate question on this
appeal is whether Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-3(1), which
makes it "unlawful for any person to transact business in this
state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is registered under
this chapter," is unconstitutionally vague. That question does not
turn on whether one, two, or even three of the seventeen available
Transactional Exemptions are vague. Those Transactional Exemptions
are, after all, nothing more than one way that the Third Criteria
for the

Exception

to the Basic

Definition

of Agent

can be

established. The constitutionality of section 61-1-3(1) depends on
whether, in light of the nature of law and the impossibility of
expressing

the

complex

concepts

involved

with

"absolute

exactitude," Owens, 638 P.2d at 1183, and in recognition of the
fact that "one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of
proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line,"
Bovce Motor Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. at 340,

"persons of ordinary

intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how to govern
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themselves in conformity with it-"

Owens, 638 P.2d at 1183.

Persons of ordinary intelligence can easily steer clear of the
conduct proscribed by section 61-1-3(1).

A person can absolutely

avoid prosecution either by not transacting business in securities
in Utah, or by becoming a registered agent.

That is how the

overwhelming majority of the citizenry of this

state avoids

prosecution under section 61-1-3(1).
A person who wants to transact some business in securities in
Utah, but who does not want to register as an agent, can look to
the Basic Definition of Agent in Utah Code Annotated section 61-113: Under the Basic Definition of Agent, a person is an agent only
if that person is not a broker-dealer, and "represents either a
broker-dealer or an issuer in effecting or attempting to effect
purchases or sales of securities."
(1989).

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2)

It is only the relatively small number of people who fit

the Basic Definition of Agent who need to be concerned with the
availability of the Exception to that definition.

Anybody who

meets the Basic Definition of Agent, and who intends to transact
business in securities in Utah, ought to be presumed to be aware of
the possibility that he or she will be deemed to be an agent.
Finally, the person who, despite fitting the Basic Definition
of Agent, insists on transacting business in securities in Utah
without

registering,

will

still

get

good

guidance,

and

an

absolutely black and white test, from reading the first two
Criteria for establishing the Exception to the Basic Definition.
If a person does not represent the issuer, or if a person receives
37

any sort of remuneration at all, then the person cannot claim the
Exception•

It is only the very rare person who will ever have to

face the question of whether the Third Criterion, which may be
satisfied

with

a claim

that the transaction

is one of the

challenged Exempt Transactions, applies. That rare individual can
choose from among a wide range of options to satisfy the Third
Criterion (including the unambiguous option of limiting oneself to
transactions

with

existing

employees, partners, officers, or

directors of the issuer, as per section 61-1-13(2)(c)), and that
rare individual can rely on well developed legal precedents and noaction letters to give a reasonable assurance of safety from
prosecution.

The person whose only claim to protection from

prosecution under section 61-1-3(1) is that the Third Criterion for
establishing the Exception to the General Definition of Agent
applies, and who has not done everything possible to establish
entitlement to that thin reed of a defense, can truly be said to be
"perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct" for which he or
she must take the risk.
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THE CONCLUSION
Utah Code Annotated section 61-1-14.5 should not be declared
unconstitutional, but it should be interpreted as establishing that
the Exception to the Basic Definition of Agent is an affirmative
defense in a criminal case.

As with all affirmative defenses in

criminal cases in Utah, the defendant need merely provide some
evidence that the defense is potentially applicable; at that point
the burden shifts to the prosecution to disprove the availability
of the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The terms "isolated transaction," "underwriter," and "public
offering" should each be deemed not to be unconstitutionally vague.
Even if one or more of those terms is deemed to be vague, however,
the law prohibiting securities transactions by an unregistered
agent is still sufficiently definite to put a reasonable person on
notice as to what conduct is prohibited.

As such the statute is

not void for vagueness.
The State respectfully requests that this court strike Judge
Frederick's Findings of Fact and Order, and remand the case with
instructions that the matter should be set for trial.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of June, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
DAVID N. SONNENREICH
Assistant Attorney General
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THE ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

EXHIBIT B:

UTAH CODE ANN. S 61-1-14 (1989 & SUPP. 1990)

EXHIBIT A:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

NOV.U

tsso
NTY

JAMES N. BARBER, #0198
Attorney for Defendant
255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-8998
IM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COOTTY
STATE OP UTAH
STATE OP UTAH,
PIHHBGS OP PACT AHD
ORDER OP DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
v.

Case Ho. 901900921
Judge Frederick

ARNOLD J. SWBHSON,
Defendant.

Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss came on r e g u l a r l y

for

hearing before the C o u r t on the 29th day of August, 1990, a t the
hour of 1:30 p.m., by s p e c i a l s e t t i n g .

The S t a t e of Otah was

r e p r e s e n t e d by A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l Sandy Mooy; and
defendant was p e r s o n a l l y p r e s e n t and r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s c o u n s e l
James N. Barber.
The Motion and Authorities submitted by defendant were
reviewed and the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and arguments of the p a r t i e s were
heard.

No memorandum was submitted by the S t a t e of Utah due to

the s h o r t time a v a i l a b l e between the f i l i n g of the d e f e n d a n t ' s
Motion and the hearing d a t e .

Based upon the information presented

to the Court, and good cause o t h e r w i s e a p p e a r i n g , the Court does
herewith make and enter the following -

FINDINGS OP FACT

1.
violating

Defendant stands charged herein with three counts of

S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 3 ( 1 ) and 6 1 - 1 - 2 1 , Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended, t h a t i s ,

selling

s e c u r i t i e s without being a

licensed agent.
2.

Defendant has represented via proffer by h i s counsel

t h a t he would t e s t i f y in h i s own b e h a l f on any t r i a l of t h i s c a u s e
that he received no consideration for arranging the

transactions

at i s s u e in the c o u n t s of t h e I n f o r m a t i o n w i t h which he remains
charged.

Defendant's counsel

a l s o proffered

that Rodney Goodman

might t e s t i f y that the defendant did r e c e i v e compensation.
3.

While i t i s t r u e t h a t S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 3 ( 1 ) p r o h i b i t s

the s a l e of s e c u r i t i e s by persons who are not registered under the
Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act, S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 1 3 , in defining "agent",
e x c l u d e s from t h e meaning of t h a t term as i t i s used in S e c t i o n
6 1 - 1 - 3 ( 1 ) , a person who " r e p r e s e n t s an i s s u e r , who r e c e i v e s no
c o m m i s s i o n or o t h e r r e m u n e r a t i o n ,
effecting

or

securities,

attempting

to

d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y ,

effect

and who: . . . [ e f f e c t s

purchases

transactions

or

for

sales

of

exempted

by

subsection 6 1 - 1 - 1 4 ( 2 ) , U.C.A.).
4.

Section

61-1-14(2)

exempts

the

following

transactions from the requirements of S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 3 ( 1 ) .
(a)
any i s o l a t e d t r a n s a c t i o n ,
e f f e c t e d through a broker-dealer or not;

whether

(d)
any t r a n s a c t i o n between the i s s u e r or
o t h e r person on whose b e h a l f t h e o f f e r i n g i s made
and an underwriter, or among underwriters;

(n) any t r a n s a c t i o n s not involving a public
offering.
5.

Under the p r o v i s i o n s of Section 61-1-14.5, O.C.A.

the burden of proving the a v a i l a b i l i t y of an exemption from the
r e g i s t r a t i o n requirement under Section 61-1-14, or an exception
from a definition under Section 61-1-13 i s upon the claimant, in
this case the defendant.
6.

The Court i s s a t i s f i e d that were t h i s case to be

t r i e d , the Court would be obliged to i n s t r u c t the jury as to the
meaning of the terms " i s o l a t e d transaction", "underwriter", and
"public offering".
7.

There are no p r o v i s i o n s

in the Utah Uniform

Securities Act (Sections 61-1-1. et seq.) or elsewhere in the Utah
Code which set forth statutory definitions of any of those terms.
8.

As the terms are not defined by s t a t u t e , the Court

has reviewed Utah case law in an attempt to find sources from
which to draw definitions of those terms to be used in instructing
a jury as to their meaning.

The Court finds that there are no

a u t h o r i t a t i v e sources s e t t i n g forth d e f i n i t i o n s of the terms
"isolated transaction", "underwriter", or "public offering" which
are complete, c l e a r , c o n s i s t e n t or a v a i l a b l e enough to inform a
reasonable man as to the meaning the l e g i s l a t u r e intended to
a t t r i b u t e to those terms as they are used in Section 61-14-2 of
the Utah Securities Act.
9.

As a result, the Court finds that the failure of the

legislature

to have provided d e f i n i t i o n s

transaction",
impossible

"underwriter",

for D e f e n d a n t

of

the terms "isolated

and " p u b l i c o f f e r i n g " r e n d e r s

Swenson t o s u s t a i n

it

h i s burden of

e s t a b l i s h i n g that he was not acting as an "agent" when he e f f e c t e d
the s e c u r i t i e s

transactions

at

issue

in t h i s

case;

and by

employing those terms in Section 61-1-14(2) without the providing
authoritative,

r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e d e f i n i t i o n s of the t e r m s , the

l e g i s l a t u r e has f a i l e d to advise a reasonable man of the nature of
the s e c u r i t i e s

t r a n s a c t i o n s which may not be e f f e c t e d

r e g i s t r a t i o n as an "agent" under Section 61-1-3(1) with

without

sufficient

c l a r i t y to meet the s p e c i f i c i t y requirements of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United S t a t e s
or A r t i c l e

I,

S e c t i o n 7 of

the C o n s t i t u t i o n

of Utah,

c o n t e x t of c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s for v i o l a t i o n of t h a t

in

the

Section

under Section 6 1 - 1 - 2 1 , ULC.A.
10.

By t h i s r u l i n g , the Court does not express or imply

any o p i n i o n upon t h e

constitutionality

of

civil

enforcement

a c t i o n s which may be i n i t i a t e d by the S e c u r i t i e s D i v i s i o n of the
Utah Department of Commerce under S e c t i o n 6 1 - 1 - 2 1 , U.C.A., or
Broker-Dealer or I n v e s t m e n t Adviser under S e c t i o n 6 1 - l - 6 ( l ) ) b ) ,
U.C.A.,

when and i f

violations

of

s u c h a c t i o n s may be b a s e d upon

Section

61-l-3(a),

61-1-13(1)

alleged

or S e c t i o n

61-1-

1 4 ( 2 ) ( a ) , (d) or (n) of t h e Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act,
11.

As a r e s u l t of the f i n d i n g s e t f o r t h in paragraph

nine above, the information herein should be dismissed.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Having

found

the

foregoing

facts,

and g o o d

cause

appearing:
NOW,
Information

THEREFORE,

herein be,

IT

IS

HEREBY

and t h e same

is

prejudice.

ORDERED

that

hereby d i s m i s s e d

the
with

^
DATED t h i s

j f f i ^ o a y of Q^totrnr,

1990.

BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:

DAVID SONNENREICH
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I
foregoing

certify

I

mailed

a

to David S o n n e n r e i c h ,

State Capitol Bldg.,

true

of

the

Attorney General's Office,

236

S a l t Lake C i t y ,

and

correct

copy

Utah 84114; by d e p o s i t i n g

same in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t h i s
of October,

the
day

1990.

OOiGC

EXHIBIT B:
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-14 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and
61-1-15:
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation,
issued or guaranteed by the United States, any
state, any political subdivision of a state, or any
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one
or more of the foregoing, or any certificate of
deposit for any of the foregoing;
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada,
any Canadian province, any political subdivision of
any such province, any agency or corporate or other
instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or
any other foreign government with which the United
States currently maintains diplomatic relations, if
the security is recognized as a valid obligation by
the issuer or guarantor;
(c) any security issued by and representing an
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any
bank organized under the laws of the United States,
or any bank, savings institution, or trust company
supervised under the laws of any state;
(d) any security issued by and representing an
interest in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any
federal savings and loan association, or any
building and loan or similar association organized
under the laws of any state and authorized to do
business in this state;
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any
federal credit union or any credit union,
industrial loan association, or similar association
organized and supervised under the laws of this
state;
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any
railroad, other common carrier, public utility, or
holding
company which
is
subject
to
the
jurisdiction of the interstate commerce commission,
a registered holding company under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary
of such a company within the meaning of that act,
or any security regulated in respect of its rates
or in its issuance by a governmental authority of
the United States, any state, Canada, or any
Canadian province;
(g) any security listed on the National
Association
of Securities
Dealers Automated
Quotation System, the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock

exchange or medium approved by the division, except
that the director may at any time suspend or revoke
this exemption for any particular stock exchange,
medium, security, or securities under Subsection
61-1-14 (4); any other security of the same issuer
which is of senior or substantially equal rank to
any security so listed and approved by the
director, any security called for by subscription
rights or warrants so listed or approved, or any
warrant or right to purchase or subscribe to any of
the foregoing;
(h) any security issued by any person organized
and operated not for private profit but exclusively
for religious, educational, benevolent, charitable,
fraternal,
social, athletic,
or
reformatory
purposes, or as a chamber of commerce or trade or
professional association; and any security issued
by a corporation organized under Chapter 1, Title 3
and any security issued by a corporation to which
the provisions of such chapter are made applicable
by compliance with the requirements of Section
3-1-21;
(i) any commercial paper which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have
been or are to be used for current transactions,
and which evidences an obligation to pay cash
within nine months of the date of issuance,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal,
guarantee, or guarantee of renewal of the paper
which is likewise limited;
(j) any investment contract issued in connection
with an employees' stock purchase, savings,
pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan;
(k) a security issued by an issuer registered as
an open-end management investment company or unit
investment trust under Section 8 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, if:
(i)(A) the issuer is advised by an
investment adviser that is a depository
institution exempt from registration under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or that is
currently registered as an investment adviser,
and has been registered, or is affiliated with
an adviser that has been registered, as an
investment adviser under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 for at least three years
next preceding an offer or sale of a security
claimed to be exempt under this subsection;
and
(B) the adviser has acted, or is
affiliated with an investment adviser
that has acted as investment adviser to
one or more
registered
investment
companies or unit investment trusts for

at least three years next preceding an
offer or sale of a security claimed to be
exempt under this subsection; or
(ii) the issuer has a sponsor that has at
all times throughout the three years before an
offer or sale of a security claimed to be
exempt under this subsection sponsored one or
more registered investment companies or unit
investment trusts the aggregate total assets
of which have exceeded $100,000,000;
(iii) in addition to Subsections (i) or
(ii), the division has received prior to any
sale exempted herein:
(A) a notice of intention to sell which
has been executed by the issuer which
sets forth the name and address of the
issuer and the title of the securities to
be offered in this state; and
(B) a filing fee as determined by
division rule;
(iv) in the event any offer or sale of a
security of an open-end management investment
company is to be made more than 12 months
after the date on which the notice and fee
under Subsection (iii) is received by the
director, another notice and payment of the
applicable fee shall be required.
(v) For the purpose of this subsection, an
investment adviser is affiliated with another
investment
adviser if it controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with
the other investment adviser.
(1) any security as to which the director, by
rule or order, finds that registration is not
necessary or appropriate for the protection of
investors.
(2) The following transactions are exempted from
Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected
through a broker-dealer or not;
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding
security.
(i) Such a security must be listed in a
recognized securities manual such as Moody's
and Standard & Poor's securities manuals where
the listing contains the names of the issuer's
officers and directors, a balance sheet of the
issuer as of a date within 18 months, and a
profit and loss statement for either the
fiscal year preceding that date or the most
recent year of operations; or
(ii) the security must have a fixed maturity
or a fixed interest or dividend provision and
there has been no default during the current

fiscal year or within the three preceding
fiscal years, or during the existence of the
issuer and any predecessors if less than three
years, in the payment of principal, interest,
or dividends on the security.
(iii) The director may by rule or order
approve certain manuals as recognized within
the meaning of this subsection;
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or
through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to an
unsolicited order or offer to buy;
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other
person on whose behalf the offering is made and an
underwriter, or among underwriters;
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence
of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel
mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for
the sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire
mortgage, deed of trust, or agreement, together
with all the bonds or other evidences of
indebtedness secured thereby, is offered and sold
as a unit;
(f)
any
transaction
by
an
executor,
administrator, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee
in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator;
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide
pledgee without any purpose of evading this
chapter;
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings
institution, trust company, insurance company,
investment company as defined in the Investment
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing
trust,
or
other
financial
institution
or
institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether
the purchaser is acting for itself or in some
fiduciary capacity;
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization
certificate or subscription if:
(i) no commission or other remuneration is
paid or given directly or indirectly for
soliciting any prospective subscriber;
(ii) the number of subscribers acquiring any
legal or beneficial interest therein does not
exceed ten; and
(iii) there is no general advertising or
solicitation in connection with the offer or
sale.
(j)(i) any transaction pursuant to an offer
by an issuer of its securities to its existing
securities holders, if no commission or other
remuneration, other than a standby commission
is paid or given directly or indirectly for
soliciting any security holders in this state,
if the transaction constitutes:

(A) the conversion of convertible
securities;
(B) the exercise of nontransferable
rights or warrants;
(C) the exercise of transferable rights
or warrants if the rights or warrants are
exercisable not more than 90 days after
their issuance; or
(D) the purchase of securities under a
preemptive right; and
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection
(2)(j)(i) is not available for an offer or
sale of securities to existing securities
holders who have acquired their securities
from the issuer in a transaction in violation
of Section 61-1-7;
(k) any offer, but not a sale# of a security for
which registration statements have been filed under
both this chapter and the Securities Act of 1933 if
no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no
public proceeding or examination looking toward
such an order is pending;
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if
the person distributing the dividend is the issuer
of the securities distributed;
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or
through a registered broker-dealer where the
broker-dealer or issuer files with the division,
and the broker-dealer maintains in his records, and
makes reasonably available upon request to any
person expressing an interest in a proposed
transaction in the security with the broker-dealer
information prescribed by the division under its
rules;
(n) any transactions not involving a public
offering;
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or
"time period units" as those terms are defined in
the Condominium Ownership Act, whether or not to be
sold by installment contract, if the provisions of
the Condominium Ownership Act, or if the units are
located in another state, the condominium act of
that state, the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices
Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code are
complied with;
(p) any transaction or series of transactions
involving a merger, consolidation, reorganization,
recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of
assets, if the consideration for which, in whole or
in part, is the issuance of securities of a person
or persons, and if:
(i)
the
transaction
or
series
of
transactions is incident to a vote of the
securities holders of each person involved or

by written consent or resolution of some or
all of the securities holders of each person
involved;
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is
given under a provision in:
(A) the applicable corporate statute or
other controlling statute;
(B) the controlling
articles of
incorporation, trust indenture, deed of
trust, or partnership agreement; or
(C) the controlling agreement among
securities holders;
(iii)(A) one person
involved in the
transaction is required to file proxy or
informational materials under Section 14 (a)
or (c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
or Section 20 of the Investment Company Act of
1940 and has so filed;
(B) one person involved in the
transaction is an insurance company which
is exempt from filing under Section
12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and has filed proxy or
informational
materials
with
the
appropriate regulatory agency or official
of its domiciliary state; or
(C) all persons involved in the
transaction are exempt from filing under
Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and file with the
division such proxy or informational
material as the division requires by
rule;
(iv) the proxy or informational material is
filed with the division and distributed to all
securities holders entitled to vote in the
transaction or series of transactions at least
ten business days prior to any necessary vote
by the securities holders or action on any
necessary consent or resolution; and
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or
revoke the exemption within ten business days
after filing of the proxy or informational
materials;
(q) any transaction pursuant to an offer to sell
securities of an issuer.
(i) This subsection applies if:
(A) the transaction is part of an issue
in which there are not more than 15
purchasers in this state, other than
those designated in Subsection (1)(h),
during any 12 consecutive months;
(B) no general solicitation or general
advertising is used in connection with

the offer to sell or sale of the
securities;
(C) no commission or other similar
compensation is given, directly or
indirectly, to a person other than a
broker-dealer or agent licensed under
this
chapter,
for
soliciting
a
prospective purchaser in this state; and
(D) the seller reasonably believes that
all the purchasers in this state are
purchasing for investment.
(ii) The director by rule or order as to a
security or transaction, or a type of security
or transaction, may withdraw or further
condition this exemption or waive one or more
of the conditions in this subsection; and
(r) any transaction as to which the division,
by rule or order, finds that registration is not
necessary or appropriate for the protection of
investors;
(3) Every person filing an exemption notice or
application shall pay a filing fee as determined by rule
or order of the division.
(4) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the director may by means of an
adjudicative proceeding as conducted in accordance with
Chapter 46b, Title 63, the Administrative Procedures Act,
deny or revoke any exemption specified in Subsection
(l)(g), (l)(h), or (l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with
respect to:
(a) a specific security, transaction, or series
of transactions; or
(b) any person or issuer, any affiliate or
successor to a person or issuer, or any entity
subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person
or issuer generally if he finds that the order is
in the public interest and that:
(i) the application for or notice of
exemption
filed
with
the division
is
incomplete in any material respect or contains
any statement which was, in the light of the
circumstances under which it was made, false
or misleading with respect to any material
fact;
(ii) any provision of this chapter, or any
rule, order, or condition lawfully imposed
under this chapter has been willfully violated
in connection with the offering or exemption
by:
(A) the person filing any application
for or notice of exemption;
(B) the issuer, any partner, officer,
or director of the issuer, any person
occupying a similar status or performing

similar functions, or any person directly
or indirectly controlling or controlled
by the issuer, but only if the person
filing the application for or notice of
exemption is directly or indirectly
controlled by or acting for the issuer;
or
(C) any underwriter;
(iii) the security for which the exemption
is sought is the subject of an administrative
stop order or similar order, or a permanent or
temporary injunction or any court of competent
jurisdiction entered under any other federal
or state act applicable to the offering or
exemption; the division may not institute a
proceeding against an effective exemption
under this subsection more than one year from
the date of the order or injunction relied on,
and it may not enter an order under this
subsection on the basis of an order or
injunction entered under any other state act
unless that order or injunction was based on
facts that would currently constitute a ground
for a stop order under this section;
(iv) the issuer's enterprise or method of
business includes or would include activities
that are illegal where performed;
(v) the offering has worked, has tended to
work, or would operate to work a fraud upon
purchasers;
(vi) the offering has been or was made with
unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and
sellers' discounts, commissions, or other
compensation,
or promoters' profits
or
participation, or unreasonable amounts or
kinds of options;
(vii) an exemption is sought for a security
or transaction which is not eligible for the
exemption; and
(viii) the proper filing fee, if any, has
not been paid.
(5) No order under Subsection (4) may operate
retroactively. No person may be considered to have
violated Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer
or sale effected after the entry of an order under this
subsection if he sustains the burden of proof that he did
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of the order.
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